Cold Start is a military doctrine developed by the Indian Armed Forces.[1] It involves the various branches of India's military conducting offensive operations as part of unified battle groups. The Cold Start doctrine is intended to allow India's conventional forces to perform holding attacks in order to prevent a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan in case of a conflict.[2] High levels of preparedness and rapid mobilization are the main aims of this doctrine.[3]
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India's defense strategy from 1947 was centered around 'holding corps' to halt hostile advances. In response to the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, India initiated a full mobilization. Taking almost a month, the slow mobilization demonstrated the weakness of India's then current policy. The long mobilization time resulted in sufficient international pressure preventing India from conducting a retaliatory strike.
The development of this doctrine represents a significant change in Indian defense planning. Exercises aimed at reducing mobilization time and improved network-centric warfare capabilities have contributed to the development of the Cold Start doctrine. Despite the advances, this doctrine remains in the experimental stage.[4]
Drawing on the experience of the Arab Israeli war of 1967 as well as the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, Indian defense planners envisioned a new doctrine. It would involve limited, rapid armored thrusts, with infantry and necessary air support.[5]
As per Cold Start promulgation, offensive operations could begin within 72 hours after orders have been issued. Such a limited response time would enable Indian forces to surprise their Pakistani counterparts. Operations would involve armored spearheads launched from forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan.
The plan emphasizes speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant air support component, its scope remains unclear. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.
Pakistani Army Chief Declared 2010 the "Year of training". Pakistan further conducted a large scale military exercise name Azm-e-Nau 3, focusing on their capability of offensive defense in case of cold start and tested[6][7] Nasr, a nuclear-capable solid fueled missile of 60 km range, to dissuade India from following the Cold-start doctrine.[8] Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses stated that the development of Nasr indicates that Pakistan views India’s Cold Start doctrine with concern and that the Nasr is meant to deter India’s launch of Cold Start. It added that the net result would be "further nuclear impact(s) on Pakistani territory."[9] However Indian Air Force chief, PV Naik, stated that tactical missiles won't affect India's decision as "Tactical or strategic, it is a nuclear weapon. So, obviously our response would be absolutely violent as per our existing policy."[10]
On May 12, 2011, India launched Operation Vijayee Bhava (blessed to win) a defense exercise involving 50,000 troops[11] in Bikaner and Suratgarh near the Pakistan border in order to boost the synergy between the defence forces.[12] The main objective of the operation was to cut down mobilization time of military, which took 27 days to mobilize during Operation Parakram. The Indian Army confirmed that exercise was successful and it has reduced mobilization time drastically to 48 hours.[13][14][15] In July 2011, a new solid fueled tactical ballistic missile Prahaar, of 150 km range, was tested.[16] Prahaar is designed to provide the Indian army’s invading battle groups with lethal fire support.[17]
There have been many criticisms to this strategy doctrine: